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TAX TREATMENT OF DAMAGES AWARDED FOR AGE
DISCRIMINATION
by
GERALD A. MADEK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of anti-discrimination laws, the degree to which
victims should be compensated has been a subject of debate. Legislators have
always been acutely aware of competing pressures in this area. Civil rights
advocates have persistently lobbied for generous compensatory awards for
emotional distress, while businesses have lobbied just as persistently against
these awards which threaten their ability to do business profitably. The result
of these competing pressures has been a set of anti-discrimination statutes
offering inconsistent remedies.
Some statutes, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),'
representative of the first generation of anti-discrimination laws, did not al-
low plaintiffs to recover damages for intangible harm. They offered merely
back pay and other equitable relief. (This law was amended in 1991).2 Oth-
ers, like Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Title VIII),3 a second gen-
eration law, offer successful plaintiffs broad compensatory damages. Still
others, like the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter ADEA), 4
amended in 1978,1 another second generation law, are neither as restrictive as
Title VII nor as generous as Title VIII. While the ADEA goes beyond the
equitable relief offered by Title VII, offering victims of age discrimination
liquidated damages equal to back pay awarded, these damages are not clearly
labeled as compensatory, as they are in Title VIII.
* Associate Professor of Law, Bentley College, Waltham, MA; B.A., M.A. Boston College;
J.D. Suffolk University; LL.M. Boston University. The author wishes to acknowledge and
thank Margo E. K. Reder, Research Associate, Bentley College, for her excellent work on
this article.
1.42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
3.42 U.S.C. §§ 3610-3614 (1988 & Supp. V 1994). See id. at § 3613(c) (fair housing
remedy provisions are tort-like allowing for jury trials, awards of compensatory, and punitive
damages).
4.29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
5. Id. Section 626(b) specifically addresses remedies for age discrimination. Id.; see also
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
521,528, 535.
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Predictably, the lack of consistency in the remedial framework among
these civil rights laws has led to inconsistent tax consequences for success-
ful plaintiffs. In general, the judicial history of this struggle reflects an at-
tempt to balance the social mandate to discourage discrimination with the
economic mandate to adequately fund the government. This balancing act has
been particularly difficult with statutes like the ADEA where the nature of the
remedies offered is unclear. In fact, the most recent judicial debate to be
settled involves the tax status of ADEA awards. The U. S. Supreme Court, in
Commissioner v. Schleier, recently resolved this issue in favor of the
government's right to tax these awards.6 To explicate the resolution of this
conflict between workplace rights and the right of the government to tax
earnings, this paper examines the Supreme Court's Title VII decision in
United States v. Burke,7 the resultant conflict in the circuit courts over ADEA
awards,8 and the resolution of this conflict by the Supreme Court in Schleier.
While it apparently ignores the link between punitive damages and torts and
obfuscates the causal link between discrimination and personal injury, this
decision definitively tilts the scales in favor of the government's right to tax.
In so doing, Schleier sharply limits taxpayers' ability to exclude from income
discrimination awards under the ADEA and other second generation statutes.
II. TAX LAWS
a) Internal Revenue Code
The government's right of taxation has been defined broadly from the
outset. Thus, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) defines gross income as "all
income from whatever source derived."9 The Supreme Court has consistently
affirmed the interpretation that the tax code is meant to apply to "any
'accessio[n] to wealth"' which does not qualify for exclusion under a specific
exclusionary provision of the IRC. 1° The relevant exclusionary provision for
6. 115 S. Ct. 2159, 2167 (1995) (holding ADEA recovery not excludable from gross
income unless two-prong test is met).
7. 504 U.S. 229, 241 (1992) (holding back pay awards in settlement of Title VII claims
not excludable from gross income).
8. Compare Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995) (holding ADEA settlement payments were not excludable from gross
income) with Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 796 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated and
remanded, 115 S. Ct. 2573 (1995) (holding back pay and liquidated damages received in
ADEA settlement were excludable from gross income).
9. I.R.C. § 104 (1988).
10. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. at 233 (quoting Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955)). See generally Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49
(1949) (stating that absent an enumerated exception, gross income means all income, from
whatever source derived).
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awards under the ADEA is IRC section 104(a)(2), which excludes from gross
income "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement
and whether as lump sums or periodic payments) on account of personal in-
juries or sickness ....
b) Regulations and Rulings
While workplace discrimination clearly inflicts personal injury, the
central disagreement over excluding ADEA awards from taxable income has
revolved around whether these awards are the result of, or on account of,
personal injury. Largely derivative of the above-described tension between
social and economic concerns, this disagreement also stems from the failure
of the statute and its legislative history to specifically define personal injury. 2
To rectify the confusion over the definition of these terms, the IRS issued a
Regulation which sought to define more closely the meaning of "personal
injury" in 104(a)(2). The resultant guideline for determining exclusion of
ADEA awards from gross income has been that "the essential element of an
exclusion under section 104(a)(2) is that the income involved must derive
from some sort of tort claim against the payor."' 3 This regulation set the
context for determining exclusion of these awards in the principles of tort law.
As a result of these regulations, courts have predictably focused on
determining the similarity between tort statutes, anti-discrimination statutes
in general, and the ADEA in particular, with emphasis on the remedies pro-
vided.'4 Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Burke, case law clearly held
that ADEA actions were "tort-like" for the purpose of determining the validity
of tax exclusion under 104(a)(2)."5 The basis for these pre-Burke decisions
was Threlkeld v. Commissioner, which held the test for excluding damages
under 104(a)(2) involved determining if these damages were "received on ac-
count of any invasion of rights that an individual is granted by being a person
in the sight of the law."' 6 This holding classified damages for violation of
anti-discrimination statutes in the realm of tort law, which addresses viola-
tions arising "by operation of law," rather than in the category of contract law,
which addresses violations of private agreements between parties. 7 How-
l 1. I.R.C. § 104; see also Burke, 504 U.S. at 233.
12. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2); 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.104-1(c), 1.61-14 (1994); H.R. REP. No. 101-
247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 1354-55 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2824-
25; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 623 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3225-26.
13. Burke, 504 U.S. at 233 (quoting Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1305 (1986),
aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988)).
14. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 233-34.
15. See Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 792-93.
16. 87 T.C. 1294, 1307 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
17. See Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 793.
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ever, the Burke decision supplanted the Threlkeld test with a more difficult
test of whether ADEA actions were tort-like in the context of 104(a)(2).
Burke focused not on the statutory or contractual basis for claiming personal
injury, but on the nature of the remedies provided.
The IRS responded to the Burke decision with Revenue Ruling 93-88.
This Ruling allowed the exclusion from income of compensatory damage
awards for disparate treatment gender discrimination granted under Title VII
(as amended in 1991) and for racial discrimination under Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1981. This Ruling apparently interpreted Burke to make the range
of remedies allowable in a statute the sole determinant of whether compensa-
tory awards under a statute were excludable from income. In fact, the Ruling
held that awards for disparate impact were excludable from income, while
awards for disparate treatment were not. According to the IRS, this is because
Title VII allows only for equitable relief for successful disparate impact
claims and not for compensatory or punitive damages. Interestingly, the
Schleier Court criticized this ruling as a misinterpretation of Burke. In this
context, the Court pointed out that determining a statute to have a tort-like set
of remedies does not preclude the necessity of determining that the relevant
damages were received "on account of personal injury," as demanded by
section 104(a)(2).
Predictably, the IRS suspended Revenue Ruling 93-88 in response to this
criticism from the Schleier Court. The IRS also indicated that it may modify
some of its more favorable positions on exclusion of discrimination awards
from income.' 8 This reversal on the part of the IRS indicates that the Schleier
decision sharply circumscribes taxpayer ability to claim tax exclusion for
discrimination awards, not only under the ADEA, but also under other anti-
discrimination statutes. The following discussion of Burke and Schleier will
examine the nature of this circumscription.
III. THE TAXATION OF TITLE VII AWARDS:
UNITED STATES V. BURKE
The first Supreme Court decision in this area, United States v. Burke,
pertained to a suit involving Title VII.19 However, as suggested above, this
decision also changed the context within which tax treatment of ADEA
awards was examined. In addition, the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Schleier, involving an action under the ADEA, largely revisited the issues
18. See Rev. Rul. 95-45, 1995-34 C.B. 20 (suspending Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61
and inviting comment regarding Schleier's impact on awards received under the civil rights
statutes).
19. 504 U.S. 229 (1992), Rev'g, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991).
[Vol. 12
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discussed in Burke. Hence, an analysis of the Burke decision is necessary to
understand the Supreme Court's position on the ADEA.
Burke involved tax treatment of awards made under Title VII for dis-
crimination in wages on the basis of sex. After several female employees
charged the Tennessee Valley Authority (hereinafter TVA) with paying fe-
male workers less than male workers in violation of Title VII, the TVA settled
the claim by offering the plaintiffs the back pay they would have received
absent its discriminatory conduct. However, the TVA withheld federal in-
come taxes on this back pay, and the women filed for a refund of the taxes.
When the IRS disallowed these claims, they filed suit, claiming section
104(a)(2) excludes back pay awards from their gross income. 20
The district court focused on the fact that the respondents sought and
received only back pay, not compensatory or other damages. The trial court
decided that these awards could not qualify for the section 104(a)(2) exclu-
sion because they constituted merely back pay on which taxes would have
been paid had such pay been received in a timely fashion, the money was not
"damages received... on account of personal injuries."'E The Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, finding that these back
pay awards were "personal and tort-like in nature," and, thus, met the section
104(A)(2) test.22 In deciding these awards could be excluded from gross in-
come, the Sixth Circuit rejected the IRS argument that because the pre-1991
Title VII statute did not authorize compensatory or punitive damages, it is es-
sentially different from tort statutes. 23 However, a strong dissent sided with
the District Court, finding that the TVA's payment of back wages was not
compensation for "loss due to a tort. '24
To resolve the apparent conflict in the lower courts, the U. S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari25 and, agreeing with the District Court and the Sixth
Circuit dissent, held the back wages paid by the TVA did not qualify for ex-
clusion from gross income under section 104(a)(2). 26 In so deciding, the Court
focused on the centrality of damages to tort claims, noting that a tort has been
20. Burke, 504 U.S. at 232. The employees reasoned that the settlement payments were
damages received on account of personal injuries and thus excludable from gross income. Id.
21. Id.
22. Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1121-24, rev'd, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
23. Id. at 1121-23; see also Burke, 504 U.S. at 231-32, & nn. 1,8 & 12.
24. 929 F.2d at 1126.
25. United States v. Burke, 502 U. S. 806 (1991).
26. See generally Burke, 504 U.S. 229. Compare Burke, 929 F.2d at 1123 (holding Title
VII back pay awards in Sixth Circuit excludable from gross income) with Sparrow v.
Commissioner, 949 F.2d 434, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (concluding Title VII back pay awards
not excludable from gross income), cert. denied 505 U.S. 1211 (1992), and Johnston v. Harris
County, 869 F.2d 1565, 1579-80 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990) (holding
1996]
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defined as a "civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which the Court
will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages. '27 Here, the Court
emphasized that the hallmark of bonafide tort liability is the "availability of
a broad range of damages"28 which may be more than necessary to make the
plaintiff financially whole. Such damages can address intangible non-physical
injuries such as emotional distress or economic injury and may be punitive in
nature.
When comparing Title VII to such tort statutes, the Court found that,
since Title VII did not specify a broad range of remedies such as the right to
jury trials, and since the available Title VII remedies, such as back pay, in-
junctions and other equitable relief did not include the compensatory and
punitive damages which are the marks of true tort liability, Title VII could not
be considered a tort-like statute. Thus, Title VII awards did not qualify for the
section 104(a)(2) exclusion. 29 The U. S. Supreme Court affirmed the ruling
that employment discrimination causes grave harm to its victims, but declined
to view such harm as tort-like regarding available remedies. Thus, the Court
concluded that back pay awards did not qualify for exclusion from gross in-
come.
The Court conceded, however, that "discrimination could constitute
personal injury under section 104(a)(2)," but only under statutes where the
range of remedies corresponded more closely than those in Title VII to the
broad'range of remedies available in traditional tort law.30 Here, by way of
example, the Court pointed to Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and
other federal anti-discrimination statutes which allow for jury trials, compen-
satory damages, and punitive damages. 3 Under such statutes, damages
awarded could qualify for exclusion from gross income, since the statute
under which the action would be brought, unlike Title VII, would evidence a
"tort-like conception of injury and remedy. 3 2 Interestingly, the Civil Rights
Title VII back pay awards not excludable from gross income) and Thompson v. Commissioner,
866 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding back pay awards not excludable from gross income).
There are other pre-Burke cases. See also Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 592 (4th
Cir. 1990) (finding punitive damages in defamation settlement are not excludable from gross
income); Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding compensatory
and punitive damages awarded in defamation suit excludable); Kemp v. Commissioner, 771
F. Supp. 357, 359 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (stating punitive damages received in settlement of civil
rights action not excludable).
27. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 2 (5th
ed. 1984).
28. Burke, 504 U.S. at 235; Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978).
29. Burke, 504 U.S. at 238-39.
30. Id.; Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 n.10 (1974).
31. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (citing statutes and remedies provisions).
32. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 239 (noting that Title VlI's sole remedial focus is the award of
[Vol. 12
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Act of 1991 essentially amends the Title VII remedies provisions considered
in Burke, so that remedies now conform to Burke's guidelines and will pre-
sumably qualify for exclusion from gross income.33 Clearly, the Burke Court
has specified that the test for whether back pay awards under anti-discrimi-
nation statutes can be excluded from gross income rests in the framework for
remedies provided in the statute under which an action is brought. If the rem-
edies are similar enough to those available in tort law, the inference can be
drawn that injuries sustained under such a statute are also similar enough to
the personal injuries traditionally redressed under tort law to qualify for ex-
clusion from income under 104(a)(2). The Court found that the pre-1991 Title
VII provisions lacked the range of remedies necessary to meet this test. Thus,
personal injuries sustained under this statute could not be deemed the type of
personal injuries specified in section 104(a)(2). As such, no awards under
pre-1991 Title VII would qualify for exclusion from gross income.
Noteworthy, however, is the fact that the Burke dissent took issue with
the determinative emphasis the majority placed on remedies available under
Title VII. In this context, Justice O'Connor asserted that "the remedies avail-
able to Title VII plaintiffs do not fix the character of the right they seek to en-
force."34 Rather Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Thomas, contended that
"the purposes and operation of Title VII are closely analogous to those of tort
law, and that similarity [of legislative purposes rather than remedies] should
determine excludability of recoveries for personal injury under 26 U.S.C. sec-
tion 104 (a)(2)." Justice O'Connor emphasized that the harm inflicted by
employment discrimination constitutes the type of "personal injury" alluded
to in section 104(a)(2), and, so recoveries under Title VII should be exclud-
able from gross income. This position was one she reiterated in her dissent
in Schleier. The dissent crystallized the issue as whether, in truth, employ-
ment discrimination causes real personal injury, not whether the remedies
available for employment discrimination are like those available for other
types of personal injury, and cited persuasive precedent in support of this
position.35
back wages, while tort law remedies intend to redress personal injuries).
33. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. The Burke Court acknowledged that while
the 1991 Act considerably expanded remedies for intentional discrimination, these changes
"cannot be imported back into analysis of the [Title VII] statute as it existed at the time" the
actionable claim arose. Burke, 504 U.S. at 241 n.12.
34. Id. at 248-49 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices pointed out the
shallowness of the majority's assertion that the remedies define the category of law - even
though there are many other components of a law to consider when classifying laws. Id.
35. See id. at 251-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,
482 U.S. 656, 668-69 (1987) (noting how the Supreme Court considered the purpose, and the
rights protected under the law, rather than the recovery available); Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261, 277 (1985) (noting that federal law protects individuals from tort-like personal
injuries).
1996]
7
Madek: Tax Treatment of Damages Awarded
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1996
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
IV. THE TAXATION OF ADEA AWARDS IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
Rather than clarifying the issues involved in taxation of recoveries for
employment discrimination, the Burke decision caused significant confusion
among the circuit courts regarding taxation of recoveries under the ADEA. In
this context, the same issues surfaced which had surfaced relative to taxation
of awards under Title VII. Hence, the circuits became divided over whether
personal injury caused by age discrimination in the workplace was suffi-
ciently tort-like to qualify resulting recoveries for exclusion from gross in-
come under section 104(a)(2).
When dealing with suits under the ADEA, however, the courts have been
forced to push their reasoning beyond the "comparable remedies" reasoning
offered in Burke because, as suggested above, the ADEA (as amended in
1978) is a second generation anti-discrimination statute, allowing for jury
trials and the award of liquidated damages in an amount equal to the award of
back pay. Ostensibly, recoveries under the ADEA should not run into the
same roadblocks to tax exclusion as did actions brought under the pre-1991
Title VII statute, since the ADEA evidences more similarity to traditional tort
statutes in terms of specified remedies.
Indeed, at first glance, the ADEA meets the Burke test for exclusion of
recoveries from gross income. However, the sticking point for the courts has
been the vagueness of this statute in defining the purpose of the liquidated
damages it allows. In truth, the legislative history and the wording of the
statute appear to be at odds on this point. Congress, in articulating the reason-
ing behind drafting the ADEA, made clear that this statute is modeled on the
Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter "FLSA").36 Further, in defining the
purpose of permitting liquidated damages under the ADEA, Congress cited
the Supreme Court's finding in Overnight Motor Transportation Company v.
Missel.37 Here, the Court made clear that the award of liquidated damages
under the FLSA, and by analogy under the ADEA, was "not a penalty," but
rather a way to provide full compensatory relief for losses that are "too ob-
scure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages. '"38
The legislative history of this Act makes clear, then, that the purpose of
the liquidated damages it allows is to compensate the plaintiff for "nonpecu-
niary losses. ' 39 However, the wording of the ADEA statute itself seems to.
belie this purpose since it emphasizes that liquidated damages should be
36. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1994). See H.R. CONF. REP., supra note 5, at 535.
37. 316 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1942).
38. Id.
39. See H.R. CONF. REP. supra note 5, at 535.
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awarded only "in cases of willful violations of this chapter."'40 The latter
wording implies a punitive intent with its emphasis on the motivation of the
employer who violates this statute. If the purpose of liquidated damages
under the ADEA is not punitive in nature, why would the willful intent of the
violator be relevant?
This ambiguity over the purpose of liquidated damage awards under the
ADEA was reflected in the circuit court decisions involving exclusion of these
awards from gross income to avoid taxation. It should be noted, however, that
the U.S. Tax Court has adamantly supported the taxpayers' position that
ADEA recoveries should be excluded from gross income.41 Indeed, by resolv-
ing this ambiguity in Schleier, the Supreme Court narrowed more definitively
the category of recoveries for discrimination which qualify for exclusion from
gross income. However, to understand this most recent Supreme Court case,
it is necessary to first examine the conflict which emerged among the courts
in cases subsequent to Burke.42 Most notable was the Ninth Circuit's exclu-
sion from gross income of liquidated damages under the ADEA43 and the
Seventh Circuit's opposite conclusion regarding this issue.44
a) Schmitz v. Commissioner
Schmitz v. Commissioner45 involved a plaintiff in a class action suit
against United Airlines for age discrimination. Using the remedies specified
in the ADEA, United paid Schmitz a settlement of $115,050, half of which
40. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). The ADEA states that its provisions will be enforced in accordance
with FLSA. Id.
41. See Burns v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3116, 3118 (1994) (discussing Tax
Court's belief that awards and settlements are not taxable income).
42. In addition to the Seventh and Ninth Circuit opinions discussed infra, district courts in
the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, the Fifth Circuit, and the Tax Court have addressed the
same issue. See Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 960 (5th Cir. 1993)
(distinguishing back wages, which are taxable, from back pay awards, which are not,
if they redress tort-like injuries); Drase v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 1077, 1079 (N.D. I11.
1994) (ADEA remedies parallel the pre-amendment Title VII and recoveries are not excludable
since statute does not redress tort-type injuries); Shaw v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 1378,
1382 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (ADEA recoveries not excludable since they are not damages resulting
from personal injuries); Maleszewski v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 1553, 1557 (M.D. Fla.
1993) (ADEA not a tort-like statute); Burns, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) at 3116-18 (upholding exclusion
of ADEA recovery); Fite v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1588, 1593 (1993) (entire
ADEA award excludable).
43. See Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d at 796.
44. See Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d at 840. Prior to Burke, three circuits issued
opinions on the taxability of ADEA awards. See Redfield v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 940 F.2d
542, 549 (9th Cir. 1991) (ADEA damages tort-like, thus excludable); Pistillo v. Commissioner,
912 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir. 1990) (ADEA settlement excludable); Rickel v. Commissioner,
900 F.2d 655, 666 (3d Cir. 1990) (ADEA settlement excludable).
45. 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 2573 (1995).
1996]
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was designated back pay and half of which was designated liquidated dam-
ages. Schmitz paid taxes on the portion of the settlement which was back pay,
but not on the liquidated damages. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
claimed that the entire award was taxable. Schmitz initially argued that the
liquidated damages portion was excludable under section 104(a)(2), then
amended his argument to claim, in light of Rickel v. Commissioner,46 that the
entire award was excludable.4 ' The Tax Court held for Schmitz. Upon the
Commissioner's appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding
that the Schmitzs' could exclude the entire amount from their gross income
for tax purposes.48
In holding for Schmitz, the Ninth Circuit focused on the two-part test for
determining the excludability of damages under section 104(a)(2) which it had
recently formulated in Hawkins v. United States.4 9 That test considers exclud-
able damages where the taxpayer can demonstrate "the underlying cause of
action was tort-like within the meaning of United States v. Burke" and "that
the damages were received 'on account of' the taxpayer's personal injury." '5
The Ninth Circuit then had to decide if the ADEA created a tort-like cause of
action, and whether the back pay and liquidated damages were received "on
account of' Schmitz' personal injuries.
Addressing the first part of this test, whether the ADEA created a tort-
like cause of action, the court decided, because of its provision for jury trials
and liquidated damages, the ADEA did indeed create a tort-like cause of
action. Here, the Schmitz court agreed with most post-Burke and pre-Schleier
decisions, focusing on the two provisions of the ADEA which, by compensat-
ing plaintiffs beyond the exact wages due them, clearly distinguished this anti-
discrimination statute from the pre-1991 version of Title VII considered in
Burke.51
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Commissioner's claim that ADEA awards
do not, under Burke, qualify for tax exclusion. The Commissioner claimed
such awards do not proceed from tort-like causes of action because the ADEA
does not provide for damages for emotional distress and because the ADEA's
damages are punitive not compensatory in nature, this latter fact more sugges-
tive of contract principles than tort principles. 2  In rejecting the
Commissioner's position, the court held that a statute did not have to "provide
46. 900 F.2d 655 (3d. Cir. 1990).
47. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 791.
48. Id. at 795-96.
49. Id. at 792; see also Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d'at 1083.
50. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1083; see also United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. at 233.
51. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 793-94.
52. Id. at 793.
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a complete spectrum of tort remedies before it may be deemed to redress a
tort-ype right."53 Thus, the fact that the ADEA allowed the award of liqui-
dated damages, rather than the fact that it did not specifically provide for emo-
tional damages, was the relevant point for the Ninth Circuit.
Further, the court found that case law and ADEA legislative history
suggested that ADEA liquidated damages have compensatory as well as pu-
nitive purposes 54 and that the punitive purpose is more tort-like than contract-
like since it seeks to deter violation of a public law-based right.5 In light of
these points, the Schmitz court held that the ADEA, even given the constraints
imposed by Burke, does indeed create a tort-like cause of action.
When considering the second part of the Hawkins test, whether the liq-
uidated damages Schmitz received were "on account of' his personal injury,
the Ninth Circuit again decided in the affirmative. The Commissioner
claimed that the liquidated damages were received on account of United's
misconduct, instead of on account of any injury suffered by Schmitz, disquali-
fying these damages from the exclusionary provision of section 104(a)(2).56
This position also reinforced the Commissioner's contention that these dam-
ages were punitive and were, thus, disqualified from exclusion. While agree-
ing that section 104 (a)(2) implies, through the words "on account of," that a
compensatory purpose is necessary for exclusion and that the damages re-
ceived "must bear some relationship to the taxpayer's underlying personal
injury," the Ninth Circuit found ADEA liquidated damages have a compen-
satory purpose and reflect the necessary "on account of' relationship to per-
sonal injury.57
To bolster this holding, the Schmitz court pointed to the traditional pur-
pose of liquidated damages: "to compensate victims for damages which are
too obscure and difficult to prove. 5 8 The Court further pointed out that
ADEA liquidated damages bear a direct relationship to the underlying per-
sonal injury, since they are always equal to the amount of pay lost. Thus, the
more significant the claim is, the more significant the liquidated damages are,
53. Id. (emphasis added); see also Bennett v. United States, 30 Cl. Ct. 396, 400 (1994)
rev'd., No. 94-5107, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849 (Fed. Cir. July 10, 1995).
54. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 793; see also H.R. CONF. REP., supra note 5, at 528, 535.
55. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 793; see also Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150, 160 (1991),
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (6th ed. 1990)).
56. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 794.
57. Id. at 796; see also Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d at 591; Bennett, 30 CI. Ct. at
401; Downey, 100 T.C. at 634.
58. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 794; see also Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707
(1945); Overnight Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1942).
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making the "on account of' relationship between the underlying personal
injury and the liquidated damages award direct and clear.59
Again, while admitting that ADEA liquidated damages do have a deter-
rent function, the Ninth Circuit held that this fact did not turn compensatory
damages into punitive damages. Rather, the Court felt that Congress was
attempting to avoid imposing burdensome financial penalties on businesses
which did not intentionally violate the ADEA by providing "only victims of
willful discrimination should receive obscure and difficult to prove compen-
satory damages."6 Thus, the "wilfulness" requirement for awarding liqui-
dated damages under the ADEA, rather than being primarily punitive in na-
ture, was a method for limiting the economic impact of these awards on busi-
ness by hitting only the most egregious offenders with the heaviest economic
penalties. Further proof of this Congressional intent, the Ninth Circuit
pointed out, was that Congress emphasized the compensatory rather than
deterrent function of these damages by labeling them "liquidated", and thus
nontaxable, rather than "punitive," and thus taxable, damages. 61
The Schmitz decision offered a comprehensive framework for allowing
ADEA liquidated damages awards the exclusionary prerogative of section
104(a)(2) while respecting the parameters of Burke. This decision focused on
the ADEA's provision for liquidated damages as proof of the compensatory
relationship between the personal injury sustained by the taxpayer and the
financial award received. Such a provision is clearly absent from the pre- 1991
Title VII statute, the purview of the Burke court, and so becomes the obvious
vehicle for insulating ADEA awards from the broad taxability suggested in
Burke. The underlying rationale in the Schmitz court, and, in the dissent in the
Supreme Court's Schleier holding, is that employment discrimination obvi-
ously causes personal injury that awards in such cases are clearly compensat-
ing for this injury, and, therefore, they should be excludable from gross in-
come for tax purposes. Schmitz, along with companion cases Keller and Rice,
were vacated and remanded to the Ninth Circuit by the Supreme Court in light
of Schleier.6"
59. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 795; see also Rice v. United States, 35 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 1994),
vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 2573 (1995); Keller v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 1072 (9th
Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 2573 (1995).
60. Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 795.
61. Id. at 796.
62. See 115 S. Ct. 2573 (1995). Immediately following Schleier, the Court granted certiorari,
then vacated and remanded these cases for further consideration. See infra notes 65-86 and
accompanying text (discussing decisions since Schleier).
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b) Downey v. Commissioner
As mentioned above, the taxpayer in Schmitz was one of a number of
United Airlines pilots forced to retire as a result of illegal age discrimination.
Many of these pilots engaged in the same struggle with the courts over taxa-
tion of their awards as did Schmitz. In fact, the lack of any consistency in the
various court decisions over taxing the United awards prompted the Supreme
Court to resolve the matter with its holding in Schleier. The lack of consis-
tency which prompted the Supreme Court to intervene is starkly illustrated in
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Downey v. Commissioner.6 3 Handed down
on the same day as the Ninth Circuit's decision in Schmitz, Downey took the
opposite position on taxability of ADEA awards, holding both back pay
awards and liquidated damages received under this statute were taxable.64
In deciding ADEA awards were taxable, the Downey court focused on
the first part of the Hawkins test, whether actions under the ADEA were tort-
like. Finding that such actions were not tort-like, the Seventh Circuit did not
proceed to consider whether Downey's award was received "on account of
personal injury." The Downey court implied that the Treasury Regulation
suggesting the tort-like test set too low a threshold for determining taxability
of ADEA awards which should redress only physical or mental injury.6 5
Nonetheless, the Court found that actions under the ADEA did not even meet
this low threshold. In finding these awards ineligible for tax exclusion under
section 104(a)(2), the Seventh Circuit relied on Burke to characterize the
ADEA as insufficiently tort-like. While the Schmitz court focused on the
ADEA's provision for jury trials and liquidated damages as evidence of a
telling difference from Title VII (which allowed ADEA awards to escape the
taxation mandated by Burke), the Downey court found the ADEA's liquidated
damages did not shield ADEA awards from taxation.
In so finding, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Burke Court that the
necessary marker for tort liability is "the availability of a broad range of
damages to compensate the plaintiff for injuries caused by the violation of a
legal right. ' 66 In addition, the court further emphasized Burke's mandate that
63. 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995).
64. 33 F.3d at 840; see supra notes 44-63 and accompanying text (discussing Schmitz).
65. Schmitz, 33 F.3d at 838; see also I.R.C. § 104(a)(2); Treas. Reg. 1.104-1(c) (1994).
See generally Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (Scalia, J., concurring).
66. Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Burke, 504 U.S.
at 235. The circuit courts also split in a related issue, regarding the taxability of punitive
damages awards. Compare Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 1994), aff'g
100 T.C. 93 (1993) (holding that punitive damages awarded under pre-1989 version of I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2) are excluded from gross income) with Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077,
1083 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding punitive damages bore no relationship to actual personal injuries
and thus are a non-excludable windfall). See generally Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228,
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if a statute is to provide a tort-like cause of action, it must specifically autho-
rize compensation for intangible elements of personal injury such as pain and
suffering, emotional distress or humiliation. Since the ADEA does not
specify that liquidated damages are to compensate for intangible harms, the
Downey court reasoned that ADEA actions do not meet the Burke test for
exclusion of awards from taxation.67 In this context, the Seventh Circuit re-
jected the Ninth Circuit's position that the traditional view of liquidated dam-
ages as compensatory is sufficient to render the ADEA capable of producing
a tort-like action. Rather, the Downey court required these liquidated damages
be specifically earmarked as compensation for intangible harms.
Having rejected the Ninth Circuit's view of the ADEA's liquidated
damages, the Seventh Circuit offered its own explanation of the purpose for
these damages. It postulated that these damages represent a form of prejudg-
ment interest, a type of contract remedy intended to "compensate a party for
those difficult to prove losses that often arise from a delay in the performance
of obligations. ' 68 As such, the ADEA's liquidated damages would not be
markers of a tort action, but would instead be indicative of a contract action.
Thus, awards for violation of the ADEA would be subject to taxation.
There is a seminal difference between the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Schmitz and the Seventh Circuit's holding in Downey. The Ninth Circuit, like
the dissent in Burke, considered the personal injury sustained as a result of
employment discrimination tortious in nature. This was in spite of the fact
that the ADEA does not specify its liquidated damages as compensation for
tortious personal injury. The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, like the
majority in Burke, declined to view the personal injury sustained as a result
of employment discrimination as tortious, absent a specific provision in the
anti-discrimination statute for damages for tortious injuries. From this con-
flict flows the disagreement over the nature of liquidated damages provided
by the ADEA and the disagreement over whether ADEA awards can be ex-
cluded from gross income for tax purposes. To resolve this fundamental
conflict over how much to infer from congressional intent in enacting the
ADEA, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on Commissioner v. Schleier.
235 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (punitive damages received in settlement of civil litigation not excludable
from gross income); Moskowitz v. Trustees of Purdue Univ., 5 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 1993)
(noting ADEA remedies provisions do not include consequential damages).
67. Downy v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d at 839.
68. Id. at 840; see also Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 151 (1956).
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V. COMMISSIONER V. SCHLEIER
The Supreme Court's decision in Schleier69 involved the same United
Airlines settlement considered in Schmitz and Downey and the same initial
progression from the Tax Court to the appeals court. In reviewing the facts
of the Schleier case against the backdrop of section 104(a)(2) and the Burke
decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the Downey court and held that the
entire settlement Schleier received from United Airlines, including back pay
and liquidated damages, was taxable as part of gross income. 70 In determin-
ing that ADEA awards are ineligible for tax exclusion under section 104(a)(2),
the Court focused on the two-part test utilized by both the Seventh and the
Ninth Circuits. Here, the Supreme Court found ADEA awards ineligible for
tax exclusion relative to both parts of this test. These awards, according to the
Court, were not sufficiently tort-like and were not received "on account of
personal injury."
In examining the first issue in the Hawkins test, the underlying nature of
the claim, the Court found the ADEA's provisions for jury trial and liquidated
damages were not sufficient to insulate it from the Burke mandate for the
broad range of remedies characteristic of tort law. 7' The Court reasoned that
simply having some tort-like remedies was insufficient to bring a statute's
awards within the exclusionary purview of section 104(a)(2). Rather, statutes
whose awards will qualify for such tax exclusion must have the primary and
critical characteristic of tort-type rights: the availability of compensatory
damages.72
In finding that the ADEA failed this first part of the Hawkins test, the
Court unequivocally rejected Schleier' s claim that ADEA liquidated damages
are compensatory in nature. Explaining this rejection, the Court cited its find-
ing in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston7 3 that Congress intended ADEA
liquidated damages to be punitive.74 In support of their contention that these
damages were at least in part compensatory, the Schleiers cited the Supreme
Court's holding in another case, Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v.
Missel.75 In that case, the Court held that liquidated damages under the FLSA
69. Commissioner v. Schleier 115 S. Ct. 2159 (1995).
70. Id. at 2167. The lower courts in Schleier reached different results. The U.S. Tax Court
found that the taxpayers overpaid their taxes because the award was not taxable. See Schleier
v. Commissioner, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1744 (1993), aff'd without opinion, 26
F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1994).
71. 115 S. Ct. at 2163-67.
72. Id. at 2166-67.
73. 469 U.S. 111, 126 (1984).
74. 115 S. Ct. at 2164-65.
75. 316 U.S. 572 (1942).
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(on which the ADEA was modeled) "are compensation, not a penalty or pun-
ishment" for "damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate. 76 The
plaintiffs further contended that Congress must have known of the Missel
finding on FLSA damages when incorporating liquidated damages into the
ADEA's remedy scheme, indicating Congressional intent to make ADEA
liquidated damages compensatory. 77
Rejecting the Missel precedent in favor of the Thurston precedent, the
Court emphasized that while the legislative history did support the plaintiff's
argument, this record had been considered in Thurston and found insuffi-
ciently compelling to prove ADEA damages compensatory. The Court also
emphasized that even had Congress known of Missel's characterization of
liquidated damages as compensatory for "obscure" injuries, the legislators
did not necessarily understand these injuries to be personal rather than eco-
nomic.71
Having established ADEA liquidated damages were not compensatory,
the Court pointed to the language in the ADEA which had driven the Thurston
decision to view these damages as punitive. The Thurston Court concluded
that the ADEA allowed the award of liquidated damages only in cases where
the employer "knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether
its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA."79 It thereafter asserted that the
employer's intent is only relevant if the damages in question are punitive. If
the intent is to compensate victims, the injury sustained by the victim is the
only relevant information and not the intent of the employer.80 Relying only
on the language of the statute, the Court rejected not only evidence in the
legislative history, but also the Ninth Circuit's observation that these liqui-
dated damages could have a mixed purpose, compensatory and punitive.
Further, the Court did not accept the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that these
damages are a form of prejudgment interest and, thus, a contract remedy.
Interestingly, in the Schleier dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Jus-
tice Thomas, pointed out that characterizing these damages as punitive rather
than compensatory does not necessarily provide compelling evidence that the
ADEA is not tort-like. Justice O'Connor emphasized that since punitive dam-
ages are available only under tort law, such a characterization of ADEA's
liquidated damages in fact makes that statute tort-like for the purposes of the
Hawkins test.8 1
76. Id. at 583-84.
77. 115 S. Ct. at 2165.
78. Id.
79. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 126 (1984).
80. Id.
81. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2170 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Hawkins v. United
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After determining ADEA awards do not qualify for tax exclusion using
the first part of the Hawkins test, the Schleier majority pointed out that even
if the ADEA proved sufficiently tort-like, ADEA awards would still not be
excludable from gross income. This is because satisfying one part of the
Hawkins test is not sufficient to activate the protection of section 104(a)(2).
Rather, to utilize this code section to exclude awards from gross income, a
plaintiff must satisfy both parts of the test.82 Again, the dissent offered an
opposing perspective on this point, contending that the Burke mandate to
prove that an action is tort-like is sufficient. Justice O'Connor based this
assertion on her view that the Treasury Regulation requiring a tort-like cause
of action was meant merely to explain the type of personal injury alluded to
in section 104(a)(2), rather than imposing a second condition for avoiding
taxation.8 3
In testing ADEA awards against the second part of the Hawkins test, the
Court found these awards did not pass the second part of the Hawkins test
either, since they were not granted "on account of personal injury." To illus-
trate why ADEA awards cannot be seen as given "on account of personal
injury," the Court used recovery for an automobile accident as an example of
"a typical recovery in a personal injury case."84 The Court pointed out that if
the victim in an auto accident suffers medical expenses, loss of wages, pain,
suffering and emotional distress, all of these can be traced to the auto accident
as cause. Both the financial and intangible harm clearly visit the victim "on
account of' the auto accident. The Court emphasized that each negative ef-
fect, individually, can be traced to the auto accident as cause, a necessary
hallmark of a tort action.
In contrast, the Court held neither the back wages nor the liquidated
damages in an ADEA action are directly traceable to a personal injury as
cause. Here, the Court postulated that even though loss of wages and other
"obscure" injuries visit the plaintiff on account of his or her age or on account
of his or her layoff, neither of these causes can be construed as personal in-
jury. 5 Therefore, the negative effects flowing to the plaintiff in an ADEA suit
do not happen to the plaintiff "on account of personal injury." Thus, in the
Court's view, the age discrimination case can be clearly differentiated from
the typical tort case.
States, 30 F.3d at 1083.
82. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c).
83. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2170-71 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.104-
1(c).
84. Schleier, 115 S. Ct. at 2163-64.
85. Id. at 2164 & n.4.
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The Court further explained that the reasons for disqualifying back
wages from tax exclusion differ from those for disqualifying liquidated dam-
ages. When discussing the exclusion of back wages, the Court returned to the
auto accident analogy. In the case of an auto accident, the causal line is clear.
The accident causes personal injury, which, in turn, causes loss of wages. In
the case of age discrimination, however, the discrimination causes both per-
sonal injury and loss of wages, but the personal injury does not cause the loss
of wages, a fact which is underscored by the lack of relationship between the
degree of personal injury and the amount of wages lost.8 6 The obvious reason
for the Court's disqualification of liquidated damages from exclusionary sta-
tus is its characterization of these damages as punitive and not compensatory.
Damages which are not compensatory (that is, not meant to compensate for
personal injury) are not awarded "on account of personal injury."
In treating the issue of intangible injury versus economic injury, the
Court conceded the obvious: an illegal layoff can clearly cause psychologi-
cal harm comparable to the pain and suffering experienced by an auto accident
victim. The Court further conceded that "the intangible harms of discrimina-
tion can constitute personal injury and that compensation for such harms may
be excludable under section 104(a)(2)."87 However, the Court explained, the
ADEA does not cover such intangible harms because, as discussed above, the
damages it authorizes are not awarded "on account of personal injury." Thus,
while discrimination can cause personal injury, this particular statute does not
compensate victims for such injuries. Rather, the ADEA makes these victims
financially whole and punishes the employer who willfully discriminates.
The dissent viewed the issue of intangible harm differently. In this con-
text, Justice O'Connor contended the Court's concession that the intangible
harms caused by discrimination constitutes personal injury logically leads to
the conclusion that discrimination causes personal injury. She further rea-
soned if discrimination causes personal injury, damages received as a result
of discrimination are received "on account of personal injury." As suggested
above, Justice O'Connor also disagreed with the Court's assessment of ADEA
liquidated damages. These differences led Justice O'Connor to conclude that
the ADEA allows tort-like actions, so that "amounts received as damages" 88
under the ADEA should be excludable from gross income under section
104(a)(2). Clearly, the difference between the majority's assessment and the
dissent's rests in a different analysis of the causal links between illegal dis-
crimination, resultant personal injuries and financial awards received. In fact,
it is difficult to deny the cogency of the dissent's objection to the majority's
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2165 & n.6.
88. Id. at 2170 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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analysis of causality in ADEA suits.
While both the Seventh and the Ninth Circuits relied on the guidelines
set forth in Burke to assess the excludability of ADEA awards, the Schleier
Court was careful to circumscribe the limits of that decision.8 9 In this context,
the Court specified that Burke only dealt with one part of the Hawkins test:
whether ADEA awards proceeded from a tort-like action, so that demonstrat-
ing the framework of remedies mandated by Burke is not sufficient to insu-
late ADEA awards from taxation. Rather, according to the above conditions,
statutes must additionally provide for awards given "on account of personal
injury."9
Clearly, to reap the benefits of section 104(a)(2) under Schleier, victims
of discrimination must bring suit under an anti-discrimination statute clearly
requesting those damages which are given "on account of personal injury."
Any anti-discrimination statute which simply allows for liquidated damages,
or which imposes a condition of employer willfulness on the award of these
damages, will not pass the Schleier test for tax exclusion. As evidenced by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amends Title VII to provide for jury trials,
compensatory damages, and punitive damages,9' the third generation of anti-
discrimination statutes may very well update old anti-discrimination laws so
as to avoid this roadblock to tax relief.
Following Schleier, the Court vacated and remanded Schmitz, Keller,
and Rice for further consideration under its newly enunciated guidelines.9 2
Furthermore, the IRS quickly acted by suspending its Revenue Ruling 93-88
which held that compensatory damages and back pay awarded in Title VII or
ADEA actions were excludable from income in certain instances. Presently,
the IRS is considering how to treat such recoveries in light of Schleier.93 A
number of decisions relying on Schleier have already been rendered. Some
involve facts quite similar to the Schleier case,94 while others rely on Schleier
89. Id. at 2166-67; see also United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. at 232-33.
90. As suggested earlier, the IRS failed to read the Burke decision as merely a partial
outline for determining whether discrimination awards can be excluded from income, resulting
in Revenue Ruling 93-88. The recision of this ruling by the IRS was in direct response to the
Schleier Court highlighting Burke's narrow holding.
91. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. See generally Burke, 504 U.S. at 241.
92. See supra notes 62 & 90 and accompanying text.
93. Id.
94. See Estate of Hillelson v. Commissioner, 62 F.3d 399 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (reversing and
remanding Tax Court decision that was in favor of taxpayer); Gates v. Commissioner, 61
F.3d 915 (10th Cir. 1995) (reversing Tax Court's exclusion from income of entire ADEA
settlement); Bennett v. United States, No. 94-5107, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849, at *3
(Fed. Cir. July 10, 1995) (reversing Federal Claims Court judgment excluding ADEA award
from income).
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by analogy to support decisions to include awards in taxpayers' income. 95 It
is interesting that none of these decisions attempt to circumvent Schleier or
contain any dissents, suggesting there is currently solid support for the propo-
sitions underlying Schleier, as well as for the analysis that it set forth.
CONCLUSION
With its decision in Schleier, the Supreme Court has settled the issue of
taxability of ADEA awards, rendering these awards taxable as part of gross
income. However the obscure reasoning which the Court presents to deny a
causal link between discrimination and personal injury is sure to leave civil
libertarians dissatisfied. Although the Court has, for the moment, circum-
scribed the potential financial gain to victims of age discrimination and
tipped the scale in favor of the economic interests of the federal government,
the balance between social policy and economic interest continues to be
adjusted. This can be seen in the latest generation of anti-discrimination
statutes, which seem written specifically to insulate discrimination awards
from taxation. The framers of these more recent statutes, cognizant of the
Court's reasoning in Burke (as affirmed and elaborated in Schleier), have
written these laws expressly to avoid the problems ADEA awards encountered
with the Supreme Court in Schleier. Thus, actions brought under the new anti-
discriminations statutes will probably result in non-taxable awards, tipping
the balance more in favor of social policy concerns. However, with the strong
competing mandates of social equality and fiscal conservatism in the back-
ground, this is not likely to be the last adjustment in the balancing act. Rather,
Congress and the courts are likely to continue to tinker with the relationship
between anti-discrimination statutes and the Internal Revenue Code for some
time to come.
95. See O'Gilvie v. United States, 66 F.3d 1550, 1557 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64
USLW 3635, 64 USLW 3639 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996) (No. 95-966 and 95-977) (holding punitive
damages awarded on account of physical injuries are not excludable from income); Lane v.
United States, 902 F. Supp. 1439, 1460 (W.D. Okla. 1995) (stating that court "is constrained"
by Schleier to conclude that punitive damages awarded on account of an insurance company's
bad faith are not excludable from income); Taylor v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 729
(1995) (holding settlement of Title VII claims does not meet Schleier criteria for exclusion of
award from income); Osborne v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 247 (1995) (finding
taxpayer's settlement was based on breach of contract and so may not be excluded from
income).
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